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Collective Bargaining as an Institution - A Long View: Discussion 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Professor Barbash states that "pluralistic capitalism of the North American and Western 
European variety provides the most favorable environment for power-based collective bargaining." I would 
only point out that the economic systems that go under the label "capitalism" differ widely in their 
characteristics, including the proportion of enterprise that is state-owned. Collective bargaining, after all, 
had its roots in 19th century capitalism but continues to thrive in the vastly different environment of the 
modern welfare state. It seems to me that there is nothing necessarily incompatible between collective 
bargaining and democratic socialism, but that collective bargaining cannot survive under totalitarian 
regimes, whether they be socialist or capitalist in nature. 
Continuity and change characterize all social systems. Professor Barbash has emphasized the enduring 
features of collective bargaining in the U.S. My purpose has been to show that these features have 
undergone a considerable amount of change and modification. In terms of the objectives of the parties 
and the structure, process, substance, and environment of bargaining, collective bargaining is very 
different today from what it was in the past. 
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DISCUSSION 
D A V I D B . L I P S K Y 
Cornell University 
Professor Barbash provides a useful summary of the fundamental and 
enduring features of collective bargaining in the United States. Students 
of industrial relations can certainly profit from a careful reading of 
his paper. 
The major portion of his paper is devoted to a discussion of "the 
historic continuities—i.e., the historically durable features—of collective 
bargaining." Although he does spend some time discussing the "forces 
working to reshape collective bargaining," it seems to me that his 
emphasis on the historically enduring features of the institution slights 
the dynamic and flexible nature of collective bargaining in the United 
States.1 No institution can survive for a long period of time if it lack&2—-' 
the capacity to adapt to the internal and external forces that impinge 
on it. Collective bargaining, no less than our legislative bodies, our 
schools, and even our professional societies, has demonstrated the flexibil-
ity and malleability that has enabled it to meet challenges that could 
easily have resulted in its obsolescence. 
In adapting and responding to a variety of challenges, collective 
bargaining has become something different today from what it was 
in the 19th century and, in indeed, from what it was in the 1930s. 
Certainly there are enduring features, but a "long view" of collective 
bargaining must also recount the dramatic changes that have occurred, 
particularly over the past 30 years. 
In thinking about Professor Barbash's seven "historically durable 
features," I found it useful to classify them according to the following 
categories: 
1. The objectives of the parties: protectivism. 
2. The structure of bargaining: decentralization. 
3. The process of bargaining: distributiveness and incremen-
talism. 
4. The substance of bargaining: economism and power. 
5. The environment of bargaining: market capitalism. 
Classified in this way, I think it becomes apparent that the major 
features of collective bargaining in the U.S. have undergone substantial, 
1
 Collective bargaining seems equally flexible and adaptable in other western 
democracies. For a recent survey, see, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market 
Economies (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1973). 
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if not radical, change over the past several decades. Let us consider these 
categories in turn: 
The Objectives of the Parties 
Labor's major objectives, at least in the United States, are very 
narrowly defined. Unions in this country have not historically been 
interested in joint management of the enterprise. As Professor Barbash 
puts it, "unions want only to bargain with the enterprise, not to run it." 
Thus, unions have, for the most part, been content to deal with manage-
ment on a select number of issues—principally those that concern the 
working conditions and job rights of the union's constituents and the 
organizational security of the union itself. 
/Although we may still call "protectivism" the major objective of trade 
unions, the expansion of union interests into new areas has certainly 
served to redefine the meaning of this concept./ Once upon a time, unions 
achieved protection of workers' interests by establishing a standard rate 
and enforcing the closed or union shop. By the end of World War II, 
all unions recognized that protection of workers' interests did not end 
with the signing of a contract, but extended throughout the period of the 
contract. Hence, protectivism came to mean the right to grieve and to 
arbitrate, if necessary. Recently many unions have come to believe that 
protection of workers' interests involves an expansion of the union's 
concerns into areas once thought entirely outside the purview of bargain-
ing. For example, unions are now more than ever concerned to enhance 
the quality of working life. I, for one, do not think that union concern 
for the quality of working life is a passing fancy. Indeed, if we ever 
again achieve a full-employment economy, such issues will certainly be 
on the bargaining table in full force. 
[The enhanced meaning of protectivism may not signify a quest by 
unions to share management responsibilities, but it certainly has meant 
the diminution of the scope of "management prerogatives."/ Union ob-
jectives have more and more involved tighter reins on management 
initiatives and discretion. According to Allan Flanders, "a modern view 
of collective bargaining . . . must recognize that it is an institution 
for regulating labor management as well as labor markets. . . . When 
collective bargaining broadens its scope from regulating markets to 
regulating management, it changes its character because different demands 
are placed upon it."2 
I think it is noteworthy that Professor Barbash did not deal with 
management objectives in collective bargaining. Here, it seems to me, 
2
 Allan Flanders, "The Nature of Collective Bargaining," in Collective Bargaining, 
ed. Allan Flanders (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1969), pp. 37-38. 
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the greatest changes have occurred. Certainly there are still many em-
ployers who sustain a high level of antiunion animus. Such employers 
view the union as an evil to be avoided and even destroyed, if possible. 
But in established (some would say "mature") bargaining relationships, 
most employers seem to have new objectives. For the employer, as 
George Brooks has pointed out, "the frame of reference is no longer 'who 
is going to win,' but 'what have we got to do in order to continue 
this agreement in satisfactory form.' "3 "Mature" managers have found 
the union apparatus a useful instrument to convince the rank and file 
that the terms of employment worked out in collective negotiations are 
the most satisfactory for all concerned. 
The Structure of Bargaining 
Professor Barbash says, "American collective bargaining continues to 
be a decentralized system mostly adapted to detailed wage setting at the 
level of the enterprise and in the nonfactory sector at the level of the 
industry in a locality." No one can deny that collective bargaining in 
the United States remains much more decentralized than the industrial 
relations systems of most other countries. On the other hand, the 
dominant drift of the structure of bargaining in the U.S. over the post-
World War II period is toward greater centralization and consolidation. 
The signs of such a drift are so abundant and well known that I need 
only list a few here: the spread of multiplant bargaining; the develop-
ment of coalition bargaining in nonferrous mining, electrical equipment, 
and other industries; the move toward regionalization of bargaining in 
the construction industry. Other signs of advancing centralization in-
clude the increased authority in bargaining of national union officers 
and corporate officials, the decrease in union rivalries and raiding efforts, 
and the wave of formal union mergers that began about a decade ago 
and continues unabated. 
The movement toward centralization has been counterbalanced to 
some extent by such factors as the apparent increase in contract rejec-
tions, wildcat strikes, "revolts" by skilled workers, and the like. But 
note that such decentralizing forces have largely been unsystematic and 
ad hoc in nature. 
The causes of increasing centralization are not difficult to identify.4 
Principally they relate to market factors, particularly the growth of large 
"George W. Brooks, The Sources of Vitality in the American Labor Movement 
(Ithaca: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, I960), p . 20. 
* Arnold R. Weber, "Stability and Change in the Structure of Collective Bargain-
ing," in Challenges to Collective Bargaining, ed. Lloyd Ulman (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 13-36; David H. Greenberg, "The Structure of Collective 
Bargaining and Some of its Determinants," in Proceedings of the 19th Annual Meet-
ing, IRRA (Madison, Wis.: The Association, 1967), pp. 343-53. 
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national and multinational corporations. Also important, however, are 
the desires of the parties themselves fpotabjlity in labor relations which 
can more easily be achieved through centralized structures. And the 
forces that Professor Barbash refers to as "socialization" and "rationaliza-
tion" both tend to increase centralization of collective bargaining. The 
movement toward centralization may slow, but there is no reason to 
believe that it will reverse. Emphasizing the decentralized nature of 
American industrial relations obscures this significant trend. 
The Process of Bargaining 
According to Professor Barbash, "The adversary posture, with only 
occasional excursions into formal integrative bargaining, somehow seems 
to be collective bargaining's 'natural' state." But it seems to me that the 
central and overriding change in the bargaining process that has oc-
curred over the past three or four decades is the movement from con-
frontation to accommodation. For most unions and employers collective 
bargaining is no longer a life-and-death struggle. On the contrary, what 
many observers now lament is not the continuation of adversary postures 
in bargaining, but a transition from constructive accommodation to cozy 
collaboration in well-established relationships. 
There is, of course, much evidence of the decline of confrontation 
in collective bargaining. For example, many studies have documented 
the secular decline in aggregate strike activity in the United States.5 tin 
recent years only about one in 20 new contract negotiations ends in a 
strike, and a high proportion of these strikes last only two or three days.l 
Many factors may explain the trend decline in strike activity, and strike 
statistics are not the only—or necessarily the best—indicator of the 
movement to accommodation. Any reasonable observer, however, would 
have to say that the climate of collective negotiations is vastly different 
today from what it was 40 years ago. 
For a second and different reason, I believe it is misleading to call 
the adversary posture the "natural state" of collective bargaining. A 
better generalization, it seems to me, is to say that the parties normally 
engage in "mixed-motive decision making." For most agenda items, the 
parties will perceive opportunities for both competitive (i.e., distributive) 
and cooperative (i.e., integrative) behavior. Walton and McKersie have 
explained that the negotiator's persistent dilemma is to decide which 
B
 For example, see Arthur M. -Ross and Paul T. Hartman, Changing Patterns of 
Industrial Conflict (New York: Wiley, 1960); Orley Ashenfelter and George Johnson, 
"Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity," American Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 59, (March 1969), pp. 35-49; and Jack W. Skeels, "Measures of 
U.S. Strike Activity," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 24 (July 1971), 
pp. 515-25. 
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strategy to pursue to achieve his objectives.6 Any strategy entails risks and 
the "correct" strategy, even for an issue like wages, is not always self-
evident. The result is that most sets of negotiations, are characterized 
by a j^nixtuxe_jQf- competitive- and cooperative strategies. \The "natural 
state" of the bargaining process, it seems to me, is for the parties to be 
at some point on a continuum between distributiveness and problem-
solving, j 
Since I agree that the bargaining process is most suited to the 
achievement of incremental change, I will turn to the question of the 
substance of bargaining. 
The Substance of Bargaining 
Professor Barbash defines "economism" to mean "the strong predis-
position to reduce bargained terms to a price or other number." I 
agree, first, that wages and related money items remain the major sub-
stantive issue in bargaining, and second, that even nonmonetary issues 
can be, and often are, expressed in terms of prices and numbers. The 
increasing scope and complexity of negotiated issues, however, has made 
it exceedingly more difficult to reduce bargained terms to a number. 
The parties themselves often disagree vehemently about the costs of a 
negotiated package. Those familiar with the procedures used to cost 
packages will attest that it is a labyrinthine art.7 Also, it is increasingly 
the case that the estimated value of negotiated benefits to the workers 
differs significantly from the estimated costs to the employer. Several 
studies of pattern bargaining in the post-World War II period have 
shown that deviations within an industry from a particular pattern be-
came more prevalent over time.8 One explanation for this tendency is 
that it has simply become more difficult to identify what a "pattern" is. 
Professor Barbash has pointed to "enlargement of the compensation 
structure" as a force reshaping collective bargaining; it seems to me 
that this factor has most especially diluted "economism" as a character-
istic of bargaining. 
6
 Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, "Behavioral Dilemmas in Mixed-
Motive Decision Making," Behavioral Science, vol. 11 (1966), pp. 370-84, provide a 
succinct statement of this proposition. See also, Richard E. Walton and Robert B. 
McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1965). 
7
 For an outline of the method used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, see Lily M. 
David and Victor J. Sheifer, "Estimating the Cost of Collective Bargaining Settle-
ments," Monthly Labor Review, vol. 92, (May 1969), pp. 12-26. 
8
 See, for example, Harold M. Levinson, "Pattern Bargaining: A Case Study of the 
Automobile Workers," Quarterly Journal of Economics (May 1960), pp. 296-317; 
George Seltzer, "The United Steelworkers and Unionwide Bargaining," Monthly Labor 
Review, vol. 84, (February 1961), pp. 129-36; and Kenneth Alexander, "Market Prac-
tices and Collective Bargaining in Automotive Parts," Journal of Political Economy 
(February 1961), pp. 15-29. 
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I have listed "power" under the heading, "substance of collective 
bargaining," because Professor Barbash identifies power with the union's 
efforts to maintain itself as a bargaining organization and with manage-
ment's efforts "to resist price and power incursions by the union." Thus, 
I interpret Professor Barbash's conception of power to involve principally 
questions of unionjse^urity and management rights. I have already in-
dicated that I believe changes in the objectives of the parties are reflected 
in the ways in which they handle these two issues. In no area has 
change been more profound. The maintenance of a union as a bargain-
ing organization once meant a ceaseless striving to organize new workers 
and to maintain current membership strength. It meant forceful or 
persuasive efforts to gain recognition from employers. But /today most 
union leaders are not involved in a struggle to organize and survive./ 
Indeed, as George Brooks has pointed out, a high proportion of current 
union members were actually "organized by the employer"—"that is, 
they were informed by the personnel officer that unless they joined the 
union within thirty days they would not be able to work in the plant."9 
/ Since the parties have moved to accommodation, the issue of "power" 
has involved not so much fundamental questions of the parties' relation-
ship as marginal, tactical advantages that bargainers may exercise over 
each other in negotiations./ 
The Environment of Bargaining 
Professor Barbash states that "pluralistic capitalism of the North 
American and Western European variety provides the most favorable 
environment for power-based collective bargaining." I would only point 
out that the economic systems that go under the label "capitalism" differ 
widely in their characteristics, including the proportion of enterprise 
that is state-owned. Collective bargaining, after all, had its roots in 19th 
century capitalism but continues to thrive in the vastly different en-
vironment of the modern welfare state. It seems to me that there is 
nothing necessarily incompatible between collective bargaining and 
democratic socialism, but that collective bargaining cannot survive under 
totalitarian regimes, whether they be socialist or capitalist in nature. 
Continuity and change characterize all social systems. Professor 
Barbash has emphasized the enduring features of collective bargaining 
in the U.S. My purpose has been to show that these features have 
undergone a considerable amount of change and modification. In terms 
of the objectives of the parties and the structure, process, substance, and 
environment of bargaining, collective bargaining is very different today 
from what it was in the past. 
8
 Brooks, p . 5. 
